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THE OKLAHOMA PUBLIC COMPETITIVE
BIDDING ACT OF 1974: INGENUITY IN
SUBMITTING TO THE PROCESS
competition.., the effort of two or more parties acting independently
to secure the business of a third party by offering the most favorable
terms .... 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Competition, the primary driving force supporting the socioeco-
nomic environment of our nation,2 has been used in the procurement of
federal government contracts since at least before the commencement of
the Civil War.3 It has been consistently recognized as the purest4 and
most efficient 5 means of achieving the greatest value for the least cost.
However, inherent in the concept of competition is the overriding focus
on success. As Vince Lombardi has often been misquoted, "winning is
not everything, it's the only thing."6
This perception of competition intensifies the natural human desire
to succeed,7 often leading competitors to devise methods by which to
achieve an "unfair advantage." 8 In Oklahoma, where public works have
come to play a predominant role in supporting the construction industry
1. WEBSTER's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 268 (1983) (syllable markings
omitted).
2. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines capitalism as "an economic system char-
acterized by private or corporate ownership of capital goods, by investments that are determined by
private decision rather than by state control, and by prices, production, and the distribution of goods
that are determined mainly by competition in a free market." Id. at 204.
3. W.N. KEYES, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION R.EGULA-
TION § 14.1 (1986).
4. Id. § 15.2 note 1. "The value of a good service, bargained out between buyer and seller in a
free, competitive marketplace, will be the purest value." Id.
5. Id. § 14.1.
6. G.L. FLYNN, VINCE LOMBARDI ON FOOTBALL 14 (1973). The actual quote was
"'[w]inning is not everything-but making the effort to win is.'" Id.
7. See generally Williams, Achievement and Success as Value Orientations, ACHIEVEMENT IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY 13 (1969).
8. One example is the use of steroids by athletes.
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through an otherwise depressed economic period, 9 the additional motiva-
tion of economic survival has enhanced the potential for such activity.'°
It is against this backdrop that we consider the Oklahoma Public
Competitive Bidding Act of 1974 (the Act)11 and two methods of achiev-
ing contract awards in possible circumvention of the "free and open com-
petition" contemplated by the statute. 12 Protest filings, 13  under
circumstances substantially similar to those considered here, have led to
resolution of these difficult issues elsewhere. 4 Undoubtedly, similar ac-
tion will eventually result in Oklahoma.
IL THE PUBLIC COMPETITIVE BIDDING PROCESS
Generally all public contracts in Oklahoma' 5 are awarded through
the process of competitive bidding.' 6 And though the value threshold 7
9. The importance of public works projects to the construction industry in Oklahoma is likely
to continue. Highway projects continue to be an ongoing source of publicly contracted work. Re-
ports that a significant percentage of Oklahoma bridges do not meet applicable standards undoubt-
edly will lead to renewed life in that area. Similarly, prison facilities have been adjudged grossly
inadequate, leading to the construction of a new facility in one major metropolitan area, with plan-
ning and fundraising begun in another. See Tulsa World, Oct. 25, 1989, at 13, col. 1; Tulsa World,
Oct. 27, 1989, at 2, col. 1; Tulsa World, Nov. 2, 1989, at 13, col. 1. See also Alvey, Jails & Prisons,
57 CONSTRUCTION NEWS 6, 20 (1990).
10. P.J. COOK, BIDDING FOR THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR (1985). "Competition can be
fierce. The intensity of competition depends upon three factors: (I) the number of competing bid-
ders, (2) the number and type of construction projects currently available, and (3) the economic
conditions, both current and prospective. Fluctuations in the economy and the resulting behavior of
competitors constitute the environment of the bidder." Id. at iii (emphasis in original).
11. Public Competitive Bidding Act of 1974, OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, §§ 101-136 (1981 & Supp.
1989).
12. J.F.CANTERBnRY, TEXAS CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL (1981). "Public contracting is
the subject of unique legislative enactments and rules of law. Because public officials are trustees of
public funds and public lands, special statutes define the permissible limits of authority and discre-
tion given to officials in contracting for goods and services." Id. § 3.01.
13. Simmons & Dzialo, Protests Against the Award of Government Contracts: Forums and Rem-
edies, 55 OKLA. B.J. 1917 (1984). For the text of the protest provisions of the Act, see infra note 48
and accompanying text.
14. City of Lakeland v. Union Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 758 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (post-bid, pre-award
negotiations with lowest responsible bidder held not violative of competitive bidding requirements,
absent a showing of fraud or favoritism); Fred Brunoli and Sons, Inc. v. Town of Woodbury, 4
Conn. App. 185, 493 A.2d 264 (1985) (post-bid, pre-award negotiation with the lowest responsible
bidder regarding unilateral mistake did not undermine the objective and integrity of the competitive
bidding process, absent fraud or corruption); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. City of Oak Ridge, 644
S.W.2d 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (post-bid, pre-award negotiations were not inconsistent with poli-
cies underlying the bidding statutes where undertaken with the lowest competent bidder); Thelander
v. City of Cleveland, 3 Ohio App. 3d 86, 444 N.E. 2d 414 (1981) (post-bid, pre-award solicitation of
commitments materially different from those bid, where pursued with only one bidder, served to
circumvent the orderly process of secret, competitive bidding).
15. Similar competitive bidding statutes exist in most states and in the federal government. See
Note, Responsibility 47 GEO. WASH. L. REv.1102, 1103-04 nn.6-8 (1979); and 41 U.S.C. § 251-260
(1982).
16. "Public construction contract" is defined by statute as "any contract, exceeding Seven
2
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varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the process employed is largely
the same throughout the construction industry, i" both in public and pri-
vate development.19
This process normally begins with the selection of a design team.2°
The team works in concert with the public agency to design the project
and prepare the bidding documents.21 After the project has been prop-
erly advertised for bids,22 these documents are distributed to the prospec-
tive bidding contractors.23 From the bidding documents and any
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00) in amount, awarded by any public agency for the pur-
pose of making any public improvements or constructing any public building or making repairs to
the same." OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 102(4) (1981).
Section 103 provides that "[a]ll public construction contracts shall be let and awarded to the
lowest responsible bidder, by free and open competitive bidding ...." OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 103
(1981).
Section 131 of the Act prohibits splitting contracts in an effort to avoid competitive bidding:
"No contract involving sums in excess of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00) shall be,
split into partial contracts involving sums of below Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars($7,500.00) for the purpose of avoiding the requirements of this act." OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 131(1981).
17. "Value threshold" in the context of this Comment means the statutorily prescribed amount
beyond which a public construction contract must be submitted to the public competitive bidding
process. See supra note 16.
18. For a general discussion of competitive bidding requirements, see 10 E. MCQUILLIN, THE
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.28-.90 (3d ed. rev.); C. RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW 262-74
(1957); E.C. YOKLEY, 3 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 442 (1958 & Supp. 1980).
19. Because it is not restricted by statute, private competitive bidding often varies significantly
from public competitive bidding in a technical perspective. However, the positive consequences of
competition, Le. "the best results at the lowest cost, the greatest value for the fewest dollars," Flynn
Constr. Co. v. Leininger, 125 Okla. 197, 200, 257 P. 374, 378 (1927), motivate the continued use of
competitive bidding in the private sphere.
20. Under the terms of OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 85.7(A)(2) (Supp. 1989), "[c]ontracts for...
architectural, engineering.... or other professional services as such term is defined in Section 803 of
Title 18 of the Oklahoma Statutes shall be exempt from competitive bidding procedures." Id.
21. Bidding documents include "the bid notice, plans and specifications, bidding form, bidding
instructions, special provisions and all other written instruments prepared by or on behalf of an
awarding public agency for use by prospective bidders on a public construction contract." OKLA.
STAT. tit. 61, § 102(2) (1981). The "bidding form" is the form used by the bidder to transmit the
bid, in its final form, to the public agency. CONSTRUCTION DICTIONARY: CONSTRUCTION TERMS &
TABLES AND AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTRUCTION 44 (1973). The bidding form will normally
consist of an outline of the information requested in the bid documents, Le., total price, prices for
alternates, unit prices, etc., all to be filled out by the bidder before submittal.
22. OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 104(1) (1981) provides that direct bid notice need only be sent to
those "known prospective bidders, who have made known, in writing to the public agency their
interest in bidding within the twelve (12) months immediately preceding the date of opening bids,
[and] at least twenty (20) days prior to the time set for opening bids." Id. Further publication is
required in local newspapers. OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 104(2) (1981).
23. OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 104 (1981) provides that "[a]l proposals to award public construc-
tion contracts shall be made equally and uniformly known... to all prospective bidders and the
public ...." Id. The manner, method, and content of such notice is outlined in the remaining
provisions of OaA. STAT. tit. 61, §§ 104-105 (1981). Complete sets of the bidding documents shall
be provided to any prospective bidder upon request. OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 106 (1981). The list of
3
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subsequently issued addenda,24 the respective bidders independently pre-
pare25 the estimated cost of the work. The cost estimated by each bidder
is then submitted to the public agency at the time and place stipulated
and on the form provided. All bids received in accordance with the bid-
ding requirements are opened publicly and read aloud. 26 The bids, and
any accompanying materials, are placed on file and remain available for
public inspection.27  Through consideration of the base bid28 and any
specified alternates,29 the public agency will normally determine which
bidder meets the criteria required of the "lowest responsible bidder" and
will award the contract to the bidder selected.30
The process of public competitive bidding, however, has sometimes
fallen prey to the ingenuity of contractors, architects, and the public
agencies involved. Through use of and familiarity with the process, vari-
ous methods have been developed which would superficially appear to
permit contravention of the purpose31 and policy of the Act. While the
legitimacy of some of these methods have been addressed in other
states,32 at least two such methods have yet to be considered by the
prospective bidders may be legitimately pared by the public agency through the use of prequalifica-
tion statements. These statements are intended to identify in advance those bidders that qualify
superficially as "responsible." OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 118 (1981). Prequalification as a responsible
bidder does not, however, vest the bidder with a property right to the contract if he or she ultimately
is the lowest bidder. The awarding agency remains empowered with the discretion to reject the
prequalified bidder's status as "responsible" provided such discretion is exercised reasonably. See
Rollings Constr. Inc. v. Tulsa Metro. Water Auth., 745 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Okla. 1987).
24. It is often necessary to modify the bidding documents subsequent to their dissemination to
the bidding contractors, but prior to submission of the bid. Such modification is commonly done
through the issuance of addenda to the bidding contractors. Upon publication the addenda become
a part of the bidding documents and will eventually become a part of the construction contract.
CONSTRUCTION DICTIONARY: CONSTRUCTION TERMS & TABLES AND AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CON-
STRUCTION 5 (1973).
25. OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 115 (1981) forbids "collusion among bidders or prospective bidders
in restraint of freedom of competition by agreement to bid at a fixed price or to refrain from bidding,
or otherwise .... Id. Bidders or prospective bidders guilty of collusion in violation of the statute
shall be guilty of a felony and shall have their bids voided. Id.
26. OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 110 (1981).
27. OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 112 (1981).
28. Base bid means the "[a]mount of money stated in the bid as the sum for which the bidder
offers to perform the work, not including that work for which alternate bids are also submitted."
CONSTRUCTION DICTIONARY: CONSTRUCTION TERMS & TABLES AND AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CON-
STRUCTION 35 (1973).
29. Alternate bid means the "[a]mount stated in the bid to be added to or deducted from the
amount of the base bid if the corresponding change in project scope or alternate materials and/or
methods of construction is accepted." CONSTRUCTION DICTIONARY: CONSTRUCTION TERMS &
TABLES AND AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTRUCTION 13 (1973).
30. See infra note 38.
31. For an evaluation and discussion of the purposes of the Act see infra notes 33-46 and
accompanying text.
32. See supra note 14.
[Vol. 25:843
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Oklahoma judiciary. However, given the reduction in private develop-
ment within the state and a consequential rise to prominence of public
work, coupled with an increase in the aggressiveness of contractors in the
competitive bidding market, judicial consideration of these issues is inevi-
table. A judicial evaluation of the statutory validity of these approaches
to the award of public contracts will almost certainly begin with consid-
eration of the legislative intent in promulgating the Act and the stated or
implied purpose of the Act.
III. MEANING AND PURPOSE OF THE ACT
In considering the validity of a public agency's approach to award-
ing public contracts under the Act, the judiciary must first determine the
purpose of the legislature in enacting the competitive bidding statutes.33
As defined, this purpose will serve as a guiding influence in the court's
consideration of a particular approach and is, therefore, of significant
importance in predicting the court's position regarding the approach's
validity.
In the 1987 case of Rollings Construction, Inc. v. Tulsa Metropolitan
Water Authority,34 the Oklahoma Supreme Court relied on two different
sources to support its interpretation of the legislative purpose of the Act.
First, the court relied on language from a treatise on municipal corpora-
tions that indicated competitive bidding provisions "are enacted [solely]
for the benefit of property holders and taxpayers, and not for the benefit
or enrichment of bidders .... ,,3 Second, the court relied on a 1927
decision36 which interpreted the language of a 1924 statute.37 The court
quoted the earlier decision, holding that the "sole purpose [of the com-
petitive bidding process] is to obtain the best results at the lowest cost,
the greatest value for the fewest dollars; in other words, it is a means for
making the best possible bargain ....
While the court appears to have reached a reasonable conclusion
regarding one underlying purpose of the Act,3 9 it did so without a stated
33. United States v. Ray, 488 F.2d 15, 18 (10th Cir. 1973); Aldens, Inc. v. Ryan, 454 F. Supp.
465, 472 (W.D.Okla. 1976); Humphrey v. Denney, 757 P.2d 833, 835 (Okla. 1988).
34. 745 P.2d 1176 (Okla. 1987).
35. Rollings, 745 P.2d 1177-78 (quoting E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 18, at § 29.29.).
36. Flynn Constr. Co. v. Leininger, 125 Okla. 197, 257 P. 374 (1927).
37. State Highway Commission Act of 1924, ch. 48, §§ 2, 10, 12, 1923-1924 Okla. Sess. Laws
1924 Spec. Sess. 51 (codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. tit. 69, § 303, 304, 1101 (1981 & Supp.
1988) respectively).
38. Rollings Constr. Inc. v. Tulsa Metro. Water Auth., 745 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Okla. 1987) (quot-
ing Flynn, 125 Okla. at 200, 257 P. at 378) (emphasis added).
39. See supra notes 33 and 34.
1990]
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consideration of the language of the Act itself ° and apparently without a
thorough consideration of other pertinent case law. These more tradi-
tional sources of statutory interpretation, when taken together with sup-
plemental support from related federal statutes,41 might easily have led
the court to identify an equally reasonable competing purpose.
This purpose is illustrated by the language of title 61, section 103 of
the Oklahoma Statutes, which requires that public construction contracts
be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder4" by 'iree and open competi-
tive bidding."'43 Further support is found in the sections that follow sec-
tion 103. There the statute establishes procedures by which the "free and
open" nature of the competitive bidding process may be preserved.'
These illustrations, along with earlier decisions by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court,45 clearly establish fairness in the bidding process as an
underlying objective in promulgating the Act.46
40. See Brooks v. Brinegar, 391 F. Supp. 710, 713 (W.D. Okla. 1974) ("the intention of the
legislative body with regard to a particular statute is to be construed primarily from the language of
the statute itself,"); Personal Loan & Fin. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 437 P.2d 1015, 1018
(Okla. 1968) ("In ascertaining legislative intent, the language of the entire act should be considered
and that construction given which is reasonable and sensible.").
41. The existence of a competing purpose is further substantiated by a statement of Congres-
sional Policy Decision with respect to Federal Procurement. 41 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. V 1987).
42. OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 103 (1981) reads:
All public construction contracts shall be let and awarded to the lowest responsible bidder,
by free and open competitive bidding after solicitation for sealed bids, in accordance with
the provisions of this act. No work shall be commenced until a written contract is exe-




44. OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 104 (1981) requires that notification to prospective bidders and the
public on public construction projects be made "equally and uniformly known," and thereafter
prescribes the appropriate methods and timing of such notice. Id. OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 105 (1981)
prescribes the content of the bid notice. OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 115 (1981) expressly prohibits "[a]ny
agreement or collusion among bidders or prospective bidders in restraint of freedom of competition
.... " OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 116 (1981) prohibits disclosure by an employee of the public agency of
any term of a bid prior to the time set for opening of bids, and of any information which is to be
contained in a public bid notice prior to the date of publication of said notice. Public employees are
also prohibited from interfering with the distribution of said information after publication. Addi-
tionally, OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 122 (1981) provides a process by which any taxpayer of Oklahoma or
any bona fide unsuccessful bidder may protest the award of a public construction contract on the
grounds that such award was not the result of "free and open competitive bidding." Id.
45. See State ex rel. Sanders v. Grisso, 184 Okla. 348, 350, 87 P.2d 155, 157 (1939) ("competi-
tive bidding requires only that all bidders be given an opportunity to bid on all plans and specifica-
tions upon the same terms and conditions .... ."). See also Hannan v. Board of Educ., 25 Okla. 372,
376-94, 107 P. 646, 648-55 (1909).
46. 41 U.S.C. § 401(1) and (2) provide:
It is the policy of the United States Government to promote economy, efficiency and effec-
tiveness in the procurement of property and services by the executive branch of the Federal
Government by-
6
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If this may fairly be considered an accurate reading of authority,
then it is clear that the statute should be construed in light of both pur-
poses with respect to any challenge to competitive bidding practices
under the Act. However, because the "best possible bargain" is theoreti-
cally and most efficiently achieved through "free and open competition,"
it would appear that fairness in the bidding process is a necessary prereq-
uisite to procuring the best bargain. Therefore, in analyzing the validity
of an agency's approach to award of public construction contracts, a
court must determine the extent to which fairness may be compromised
while still achieving the "best possible bargain."
IV. APPROACHES TO CIRCUMVENTION OF THE ACT
Several readily identifiable approaches are available for manipula-
tion by the public agency intent on manufacturing a specific outcome.47
These cases of unscrupulous, intentional, and collusive activity are the
practices the statutes were intended most to prevent. And each, upon the
proper exercise of the protest rights available in all public competitive
bidding situations,48 will be subject to judicial review and reversal upon
a finding that the public agency has abused its discretion with respect to
the award or where the award is the result of fraud or collusion. 9
But what of those cases where the intent of the agency comports
with the intent and purpose of the statute and is in all things honorable,
yet, by its very method arguably serves to contravene one of the purposes
(1) promoting full and open competition;
(2) establishing policies, procedures, and practices which will provide the Government
with the property and services of the requisite quality, within the time needed, at the lowest
reasonable cost;
(6) eliminating fraud and waste in the procurement process;
Id.
47. For a general overview of pre-award fraud in formation of government contracts see ABA
TASK FORCE, IDENTIFYING AND PROSECUTING FRAUD AND ABUSE IN STATE AND LOCAL CON-
TRACTING 3-5 (1984).
48. The protest provisions of the Oklahoma Act are embodied in OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 122
(1981):
Any taxpayer of the State of Oklahoma, or any bona fide unsuccessful bidder on a particu-
lar construction contract, within ten (10) days after any such contract has been executed, is
empowered to bring suit in the district court of the county where the work, or the major
part of it, is to be done to enjoin the performance of such contract if entered into in viola-
tion of the provisions of this act.
Id.
49. Rollings Constr., Inc. v. Tulsa Metro. Water Auth., 745 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Okla. 1987);
Eckerle v. Ferris, 175 Okla. 107, 116, 51 P.2d 766, 776 (1935); Leininger v. Ward-Beekman &
Brooks, Inc., 139 Okla. 292, 298, 282 P. 467, 472 (1929); City of Bartlesville v. Riggs, 114 Okla. 181,
183, 245 P. 603, 605 (1925).
1990]
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of the Act? What of the situation where the means to award, though in
keeping with the terms of the Act, results in promotion of one of the
purposes at the expense of the other? Although the same remedies are
available through protest procedures, there exists no dishonorable or
contravening intent. Consequently, something more must serve as the
basis for judicial decision. 0 The obvious focus of the court's evaluation
must necessarily be the acts themselves and their effect, even absent im-
proper intent, on the purposes of the competitive bidding process.
A. Illicit Manipulation of the Bidding Process
1. Manipulation of Alternates
In assembling a "bid package," public entities will often request the
bidding contractors to submit bids in two forms. In the first, the bid
reflects a contractor's estimate of cost for the entire body of the work
defined by the bidding documents.5' In the second, the contractors are
asked to submit prices for various changes to the base bid scope of work.
This second type of bid is generally referred to as a bid alternate. 2 These
alternates may include additions to or deletions from the base bid scope
of work, or may involve alternative means, methods, or materials for car-
rying out the work as bid in the base.53 In either case, defining the scope
of the bidding documents, and consequently the alternates, along with
selection of those alternates to be incorporated into the construction con-
tract, resides in the discretion of the contracting public agency.54
a. The Method of Manipulation
While bid alternates serve a beneficial function in allowing the pub-
lic agency an opportunity to evaluate a wide variety of scenarios with
respect to the scope of the work,55 they also provide an avenue for abuse
50. In many states and the federal government any post-bid, pre-award discussion with a single
bidder for the purpose of materially modifying the content of a bid is condemned as contravening the
purposes of competitive bidding, irrespective of the motivating intent. See ABA TASK FORCE,
IDENTIFYING AND PROSECUTING FRAUD AND ABUSE IN STATE AND LOCAL CONTRACTING 1
(1984) ("award is made without further discussion."); and J.F. DONNELLY, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF PUBLIC CONTRACTS, 193 (1922) ("nor may the public authorities who receive the bid
permit a change in any material respect.").
51. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
52. H.A. COHEN, PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND THE LAW 57 (1961). See also
supra note 29 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
54. The authority of a public agency to solicit and award public construction contracts is im-
plied in the terms of the Act taken as a whole. See, eg., OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 102(l)-(2) (1981).
55. See Mayor of Baltimore v. Flack, 104 Md. 107, 128-29, 64 A. 702, 710 (1906).
[Vol. 25:843
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from two very different angles. First, favoritism may be expressed by
defining the scope of one or more of the alternates in such a way as to
give a favored contractor a decided advantage over the others.5 6 A sec-
ond means of favoritism, which could easily be combined with the first, is
the solicitation for competitive pricing of a multitude of alternates fol-
lowed by a post-bid, pre-award manipulation of those alternate prices to
cause a favored bidder to be the low bidder. This is an available option
because the basis for award may be defined by the public agency to in-
clude the base bid alone or the base bid plus any accepted alternates.5 7
In some instances such practices could clearly be exposed as an arbi-
trary and capricious action by the awarding agency. However, more
often than not, the acceptance and rejection of specific alternates could
readily be justified as "in the best interest of the public." The very nature
of the "alternate" process supports this justification. In order to award
the project to the favored bidder whose "base bid"58 is not the lowest
submitted, it is necessary for the agency to accept an assortment of addi-
tive and deductive alternates that, when aggregated with the base bid,
cause the favored bidder to have the low base bid plus accepted
alternates.
The ease of justification lies in mathematical logic. In order for the
accepted total of the favored bidder's adjusted bid to be lower than the
adjusted bids of the other competing bidders, the differential between the
favored bidder's alternate prices and the other bidders' alternate prices
must be, as an aggregate, sufficient to overcome the difference in the base
bids. 9 Therefore, as an aggregate, the favored bidder's additive alter-
nates must be less than the additive alternates of the other bidders; and
the favored bidder's deductive alternates must be greater than the deduc-
tive alternates of the other bidders. In both cases it may be explained
that the public is receiving the benefit of the bargain by accepting the
favored contractor's bid because it will be paying less for the work in-
cluded in the additive alternates and receiving a greater credit for the
56. S.M. SIEGFRIED, INTRODUCTION TO CONSTRUCTION LAW 1.03(d) (1987); see also State ex
rel. Sanders v. Grisso, 184 Okla. 348, 350, 87 P.2d 155, 157-58 (1939).
57. See Mayor of Baltimore v. Flack, 104 Md. 107, 64 A. 702 (1906); H.A. COHEN, PUBLIC
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND THE LAW 58-59 (1961).
58. See supra note 28.
59. For example:
Base bid "A" = $100,000.00 Base'bid "B" - $96,000.00
Accepted alt. 1 +$ 1,500.00 +$ 2,800.00
Accepted alt. 2 +$ 4,000.00 +$ 6,100.00
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work deleted by the deductive alternates. 6
Therefore, in this scenario, the public agency benefits from the logic
inherent in the process to justify almost any decision. By defining a suffi-
cient number of additive and deductive alternates from which to choose,
a public entity need only discover the correct combination of base bid
and alternates to cause the favored bidder to be awarded the contract on
the basis of the "low bid."6 1
b. One Proposed Statutory Resolution
Although "alternates" are not discussed in the provisions of the Act,
a simple addition to these provisions could, at worst, minimize the poten-
tial effects of this sort of illicit practice. The suggested method is one
used by the Federal Procurement Act62 and clearly supports the idea of
free and open competitive bidding. The addition would incorporate lan-
guage that requires the public authority to prioritize internally the alter-
nates by rank according to likelihood of acceptance or necessity. 63 This
prioritized list would then be available to all the bidders, giving each the
opportunity to stand on equal footing. The alternates would bear a rela-
tion to one another that would prevent the acceptance of one without
acceptance of those preceding it in importance.64
60. In the example illustrated in note 59, the aggregate cost represented by the accepted alter-
nates of bidderA would result in an additional cost to the public of $1,500.00, whereas an aggregate
cost of the same alternates of bidder B would result in additional cost to the public of $6,900.00.
Therefore, acceptance of the selected alternates may be justified on the theory that the public is
paying a smaller amount than would have resulted had the low base bid, plus accepted alternates,
been taken.
61. Low bid in this scenario is determined by considering the aggregated amount of the base bid
and all accepted alternates.
62. 41 U.SC. § 253(a) (1984) states:
(b) In addition to the specifications described in subsection (a), each solicitation for sealed
bids or competitive proposals (other than for small purchases) shall at a minimum
include-
(1) a statement of-
(A) all significant factors (including price) which the executive agency reasonably expects
to consider in evaluating sealed bids or competitive proposals; and
(3) the relative importance assigned to each of those factors;
Id. See also D.P. ARNAVAS & W.J. RUBERRY, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT GUIDEBOOK 4-5 (1986).
63. Though the federal statute does not expressly refer to alternate bids, the inclusion of.alter-
nate bids in the purview of "all significant factors" is a reasonable reading of the statutory intent.
64. To illustrate this process, suppose the public agency has identified three changes to the base
bid scope of work that, if sufficient funds are available beyond the low base bid, the agency would
like to incorporate into the contract award. The agency would describe in textual and/or graphic
form the three separate changes. These changes would then be internally prioritized in order of
preference and numbered as alternates Number I, Number 2, and Number 3. The alternates would
then be published to each of the bidding contractors, along with notification that the alternates will
be accepted in their order of priority. The contractors in turn, would include estimated costs for the
three alternates as part of the bid submitted. Upon evaluating the bids, and assuming that the funds
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B. Post-Bid, Pre-Award Negotiation
This form of potential circumvention might take two distinct forms.
First, the public entity, after opening the bids but prior to award, re-
quests the apparent low responsible bidder6" to provide additional pric-
ing with respect to a deferred purchase program." Second, again after
opening the bids but prior to award, the public entity directs the appar-
ent low responsible bidder to develop a shopping list of "value engineer-
ing",67 items. From this list the agency chooses those items which are in
the best interest of the public. These items, and their associated costs,
whether additive or deductive, are included in the award. The value en-
gineering process may be used to upgrade the "as-bid" project,68 ordi-
narily at an increase to the bid amount, or downgrade the project,
thereby reducing the overall cost of the project and permitting it to come
within available funding.69
available to the public agency are in excess of the low base bid, the agency may accept in order,
alternate Number 1, Number 2, and Number 3 to the extent of the available funds. The agency,
however, could not select alternate Number 2 without having accepted alternate Number 1, nor
could it accept alternate Number 3 without having accepted alternates Number I and Number 2.
65. The public agency, by implication, is empowered with the discretion to reject the bid of any
contractor if the contractor does not meet the broadly defined criteria of a responsible bidder. See
OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 111 (1981) which states: "The awarding of a contract to the lowest responsible
bidder." Id. (emphasis added); and OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 117 (1981), which provides:
If an award is made to other than the lowest bidder, the awarding public agency shall
accompany its action with a publicized statement setting forth the reason for its action.
Such statement shall be placed on file, open to public inspection and be a matter of public
record.
Id. (emphasis added). See also OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 118 (1981), which provides:
In order to determine the responsibility of bidders, the awarding public agency may require
prospective bidders to prequalify as responsible bidders prior to submitting bids on a public
construction contract. Notice of any such prequalification requirement shall be made
equally and uniformly known by the awarding public agency to all prospective bidders and
the public in the same manner as proposals to award public construction contracts as set
forth in Section 4 hereof.
Id. But see Rollings Constr. Inc. v. Tulsa Metro. Water Auth., 745 P.2d 1176 (Okla. 1987), wherein
the Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the argument that prequalification as a "responsible bidder"
deprives the public agency of the discretion to find otherwise; and ABA TASK FORCE, IDENTIFYING
AND PROSECUTING FRAUD AND ABUSE IN STATE AND LOCAL CONTRACTING 3 (1984) ("Courts in
a majority of jurisdictions defer to the awarding body's judgment.").
66. For a discussion of the deferred purchase concept see infra note 70 and accompanying text.
67. Value engineering is "[a] branch of engineering whose objective is to effect economy in the
cost of constructing a project. Evaluating any object's function and bettering the object in terms of
dollars and functional objectives." CONSTRUCTION DICTIONARY: CONSTRUCTION TERMS & TA-
3LES AND AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTRUCTION 462 (1973).
68. When the amount of the lowest responsible bid is less than the aggregate amount of avail-
able funds the agency may choose to upgrade portions of the project with the excess funds.
69. A common example of this predicament is that of an agency or institution that relies on
donations or federal funding for all or part of the funds necessary to develop a particular project. At
the time the project is bid, a certain amount of funds, thought to be sufficient, is available for the
agency's use in developing the project. However, when the bids are opened and tabulated, taking
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Each of these methods arguably contravenes the purposes of the
Act. However, it may also be effectively argued that the integrity of the
process remains intact and the purpose of competitive bidding is not
circumvented.
1. Deferred Purchase
The deferred purchase concept operates to defer the purchase of des-
ignated portions of the work until some later date, usually within the
duration of the project.70 The deferral of "as-bid" costs permits the ini-
tial project cost commitment to be reduced to an amount that more
closely aligns with the funds allocated and available for the project at the
time of award. In this way the contract may be awarded without com-
mitting to costs beyond those initially available. By allowing the project
to go forward at a reduced scope and cost, this approach benefits the
public agency by (1) allowing the construction process to begin on what
is often a badly needed facility,7 1 and (2) avoiding the significant addi-
tional cost associated with rejecting all the bids, revising the contract
documents to reflect a reduced scope, and readvertising the project for
rebidding.
But does selecting one contractor, ordinarily the apparent low re-
sponsible bidder on the originally advertised project, with whom to de-
velop and reprice a deferred purchase program, defeat the competitive
bidding objectives of the Act? While arguments may be reasonably made
in support of both positions, the issue has not been judicially considered
at the district court or appellate court level in Oklahoma.
a. The Argument for Strict Statutory Construction
The closest resemblance to official consideration of the matter in
Oklahoma is represented by the 1977 opinion of the Attorney General of
Oklahoma.72 In responding to a question presented by state Senator Bob
into account all possible alternate combinations, the lowest amount bid is greater than the available
funds. Generally unable to contract for an amount in excess of the available funds, the public agency
is faced with a dilemma. See JF. CANTERBURY, TExAs CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL § 3.10
(1981). Rather than commit funds currently unavailable, the agency may: (I) reject all bids, revise
the bidding documents to eliminate a sufficient scope of work to bring the cost within budget, and
republish the documents for bidding; or (2) decrease the existing scope through discussions with and
pricing by the lowest responsible bidder.
70. The portion of work deferred most often will be a component that is not critical to comple-
tion of the project until near the end of the scheduled duration. Likely examples are sitework, i.e.,
landscaping and paving, and any expensive equipment.
71. State ex rel. Tuxhorn v. District Court, 464 P.2d 758, 759 (Okla. 1969).
72. 76 Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. 413 (1977). Additionally, the procurement statutes of the federal
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Funston, the Attorney General wrote, "no provision is found which au-
thorizes a governing body to negotiate with a low bidder .... In order to
be able to enter into a construction contract, [the governing body] must
either reject the bids and solicit new bids or properly declare an emer-
gency pursuant to Section 130."11
3
Though the response was fact specific, being directed to situations
where all the bids submitted exceed the engineer's estimate, 4 it appears
relatively clear that the Attorney General's position is appropriate re-
gardless of the status of the bids received relative to the available funds.
Therefore, whether the purpose of instituting a deferred purchase plan
was to reduce the scope and cost of the contract award because the bids
were in excess of the funds available, or because the governing body ex-
perienced a change of position regarding the inclusion of certain portions
of the work, it appears to contravene the competitive bidding objectives
of the Act to select, prior to award, one contractor from a group of bid-
ding contractors with whom to alter the scope and cost of the bid
submitted. 5
The purpose of the Act is to promote "free and open competition"
in an effort to prevent fraud and favoritism76 in the award of public
works contracts and to provide a fair forum in which contractors might
freely compete for their livelihood. It may be argued that by limiting
post-bid, pre-award discussions regarding scope and price to one contrac-
tor, whether the initial low responsible bidder or not, the benefits and
safeguards inherent in competitive bidding can never be fulfilled. Unless
the "competition" remains "free and open" until award, the purposes
and provisions of the Act are improperly contravened and any award
resulting from such irregular acts should be found absolutely void. Any
other result would be clearly unfair to the other competing contractors
and would not fully achieve the benefits and provide the safeguards in-
tended by the Act.
government have been interpreted to require that any post-bid discussions regarding any offer be
conducted not only with the successful offeror (lowest responsible bidder), but also with those bid-
ders found to be within the competitive range. See 56 Op. Comptr. Gen. 768,780 (1977).
73. 76 Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. 413-14 (1977).
74. Under the terms of OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 673 (1971) competitively bid projects were previ-
ously required to have been first subjected to review and pricing by an engineer. The statute requir-
ing this review was repealed in 1972. However, informal pricing by the design architect/engineer is
still done to determine whether the project, as designed, will "fit" within the "budget."
75. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
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b. The Argument for a Practical Reading of the Statutory
Requirements
A reasonable argument may also be made that post-bid, pre-award
deferred purchase activity does not contravene the purposes of the Act.
This argument, however, is necessarily founded on two presumptions:
first, the deferred purchase activity is pursued with the lowest responsible
bidder;77 and second, the competive bidding process, to the point of de-
ferred purchase discussions, has been conducted without irregularity.
Absent these essential criteria, any post-bid, pre-award deferred purchase
activity would serve only as a secondary source of dispute.78
Assuming arguendo that the competitive bidding process has con-
cluded without irregularity and that any deferred purchase activity is
pursued with the lowest responsible bidder, it may be argued that the
bidder selected for further discussion reached the position of lowest re-
sponsible bidder through full compliance with the statutory provisions of
the Act and that all competing contractors were given a similar opportu-
nity to achieve that status. This reasoning leads to the logical conclusion
that the purpose enunciated by the Act, namely that publicly contracted
work should result from "free and open" competitive bidding, was ade-
quately and fairly fulfilled. Therefore, any post-bid, pre-award deferred
purchase activity pursued with the lowest responsible bidder is within the
provisions and purposes of the Act and should be left to the discretion of
the public agency acting in the best interest of the public.
c. A Practical Resolution of the Dilemma
While it is clear that taken to a logical extreme the provisions of the
Act require the "competition" of bidding to remain "free and open" until
contract award, the statute also vests the public entity with substantial
discretion throughout the process.7 9 Again assuming arguendo that the
competitive bidding process has reached the point of post-bid, pre-award
77. See supra notes 42 and 65.
78. The Act prescribes various forms of conduct required by the public agency in competitively
bidding work. Violation of any of these criteria is cause for challenge. Likewise, though the agency
is afforded significant discretion in selecting the lowest responsible bidder, the exercise of that discre-
tion may also be challenged within the terms of the Act. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
79. A public agency is implicitly and expressly empowered throughout the Act with a broad
range of discretion in soliciting and awarding public construction contracts. See generally OKLA.
STAT. tit. 61, § 111 (1981) (implicit discretion to reject the bid of any contractor found not to be a
responsible bidder); OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 117 (1981) (implicit discretion to award to a bidder other
than the lowest bidder); OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 118 (1981) (discretion to require prequalification of
bidders); OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 119 (1981) (discretion to reject "any or all bids" and resolicit). The
Oklahoma Supreme Court has also recognized the broad discretion vested in the awarding public
[Vol. 25:843
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consideration without irregularity, it appears logical that the purposes of
the Act have been fulfilled. First, the "fair and open competition" re-
quirement has been satisfied because it is through the proper execution of
the process that the lowest responsible bidder was identified. Second, the
"best bargain" objective may be satisfied by allowing the public agency to
exercise its discretion in subsequent discussions with the lowest responsi-
ble bidder.
This position may be supported by two rationales. First, if any of
the bids submitted represent an amount below that of the available funds,
the public agency would be within its rights to award the contract to the
lowest responsible bidder and negotiate revisions to the bid amount in the
context of a change order adjustment to the contract.Y0 The subtle differ-
ence between this sort of clearly legitimate practice and the somewhat
questionable practice of negotiating with the lowest responsible bidder
prior to award is in the definition of the project scope. Because the
amounts of the bids are a function of the design as defined in the bidding
documents, the agency's failure to assess properly the cost of the project
at the design phase would necessarily result in the additional cost to the
public of redesign and rebid. It seems untenable to suggest that the legis-
lature intended to limit the exercise of agency discretion to only those
instances where it was able to assess properly the fluctuating cost of a
project while still in the design phase. Second, it is equally untenable to
suggest that the legislature would promote the exercise of agency discre-
tion in negotiating with the lowest responsible bidder after contract
award, while limiting similar discussions with the same bidder when held
prior to award. This is especially true where the discussions are pursued
in an effort to define properly the scope of the project in relation to the
available cost and thus avoid the additional cost of redesign and rebid.
Use of the post-bid, pre-award approach is compelling for two addi-
tional reasons. First, in the pre-award approach, because award of the
project has not yet been made, the selected bidder is not under contract.
Consequently the public agency has a carrot to dangle during the de-
ferred purchase discussions. Strengthening the bargaining position of the
public agency relative to the selected bidder ensures that the bidder will
agency. See Rollings Constr. v. Tulsa Metro. Water Auth., 745 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Okla. 1987); State
ex reL Sanders v. Grisso, 184 Okla. 348, 350, 87 P.2d 155, 158 (1939).
80. The term "change order" refers to the document or documents that amend the terms of the
public construction contract after award. Change orders are issued periodically during the construc-
tion process to modify the original scope of work, and normally also modify the contract amount
and/or project duration. CONSTRUCTION DICTIONARY: CONSTRUCTION TERMS & TABLES AND AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTRUCTION 84 (1973).
1990]
15
Metcalf: The Oklahoma Public Competitive Bidding Act of 1974: Ingenuity in
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1989
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
bargain in good faith during the deferred purchase discussions. More-
over, by equalizing the bargaining power, the public agency enjoys the
additional assurance that the public will receive the best bargain avail-
able. Second, the post-bid, pre-award approach permits budgetary scope
revisions prior to contract award, thereby preventing infringement of the
post-award change-order percentage limitations imposed by the statute.8
Because changes in excess of this stipulated percentage must be adver-
tised and competitively bid, as if an entirely new project,8 2 infringement
of the percentage prior to award would, quite obviously, negate the
agency's efforts to avoid the expense of readvertising and rebidding the
same project. In addition, coordination related problems could arise
should a contractor other than the original contractor be successful in
the subsequent letting.
A second rationale supports the position that the public agency
should be vested with the discretion to pursue pre-award discussions
with the lowest responsible bidder without being found to contravene the
Act. Simply stated, absent any fraudulent activity by the public agency
during the deferred purchase discussions, the general public will receive
the benefit of those discussions, and this benefit will only be enhanced by
the increased bargaining power of the public agency, resulting from the
character of pre-award deferred purchase activity.
Oklahoma courts have clearly identified the interests of the public as
the primary interest to be preserved by competitive bidding. 3 In so do-
ing, the courts have vested the public agency with the discretion to ad-
minister the Act in a manner that most suitably achieves that end.8 4 The
public agency functions neither autonomously nor without established
guidelines.8" Its conduct remains subject to judicial review through the
filing of a statutorily prescribed protest 6 by any taxpayer or competing
81. The Act imposes limitations on the aggregated amount of change orders that may be ap-
pended to a public works construction contract. Generally, OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 121 (1981) pro-
vides that the total amount of change orders is limited to the following percentages of the original
contract amount: (1) If the original contract amount is less than or equal to $1,000,000.00, the
maximum aggregated change order amount may not exceed fifteen percent of the original contract;
(2) If the original contract amount is greater than $1,000,000.00, the maximum aggregated change
order amount may not exceed ten percent.
82. Changes to the scope of work requiring additive change orders in excess of these statutorily
stipulated percentages must be readvertised for bids. OKLA. STAT. tit. 61, § 121 (1981).
83. The primary interest to be served by competitive bidding is that of the public. Supra notes
33-46 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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contractor, 87 and it must operate within the statutorily prescribed guide-
lines of the Act. The utilization of these safeguards should adequately
protect both the interests of the public and the competing contractors in
the event of fraudulent, collusive, or biased acts by the public agency.
2. Value Engineering
Value engineering operates in much the same manner as the de-
ferred purchase concept. It involves the attempt to amend the bid of the
lowest responsible bidder by negotiating with the bidder after the com-
petitive bidding process has concluded. Like the deferred purchase con-
cept, value engineering attempts to change the scope of the as-bid
project 8 and reap the cost benefits associated with a decreased scope.
This process differs from the deferred purchase concept primarily in
its structure. Whereas the deferred purchase concept relies largely on the
public agency's input in defining the scope of the discussion and pricing,
the value engineering concept relies almost exclusively on the ingenuity
and imagination of the bidder to propose changes to the scope of the
work and provide the concomitant pricing. It is then within the agency's
discretion to accept or reject the changes proposed.
Because of the similar character of post-bid, pre-award value engi-
neering negotiation and post-bid, pre-award deferred purchase negotia-
tion, the arguments in support and derogation of the validity of each are
likewise very similar. Each must also necessarily be founded on the same
basic presumptions: (1) that the competitive bidding process to the point
of post-bid, pre-award has been conducted without irregularity; (2) that
the selection of the lowest responsible bidder was accomplished without
fraud, collusion, or favoritism; and (3) that the post-bid, pre-award nego-
tiations are pursued with the lowest responsible bidder.
a. The Argument For Strict Statutory Construction
Again it may be argued that the full benefit of competitive bidding,
and therefore the full purpose of the Act, is not fulfilled unless the com-
petitive process remains "free and open" until award. In the case of post-
bid, pre-award value engineering, this means the competitive process
must necessarily be available to all competing contractors throughout
87. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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any value engineering discussions that occur after the bid opening. Ab-
sent the opportunity for participation by all interested bidders, 9 the pur-
poses of the Act are not fulfilled and any award that results from value
engineering should be invalidated upon the proper filing of a protest pur-
suant to section 122 of the Act.9"
b. The Argument for a Practical Reading of the Statutory
Requirements
In support of the post-bid, pre-award pursuit of value engineering
negotiations with only the lowest responsible bidder, it may be argued
that the legislature vested the public agency with substantial discretion in
administering the Act in the best interests of the public and in fairness to
the competitive bidders as a whole. It may be argued further that the
value engineering negotiation with the lowest responsible bidder does not
contravene the competitive process mandated by the Act because it is
through the competitive process that the lowest responsible bidder is es-
tablished. In addition, by negotiating through the value engineering pro-
cess prior to awarding the contract, the public agency is in a superior
bargaining position, thereby better achieving the best interests of the pub-
lic and fulfilling the judicially recognized purpose of the Act. Finally,
continuing to bargain after the bids have been received permits the public
agency to avoid the costly and time consuming process of revising the
contract documents, re-advertising, and rebidding the project only to run
the risk that the bids will again be of such a nature as to make awarding
the contract impossible.
c. A Practical Resolution to the Dilemma
As with the deferred purchase concept, either argument has signifi-
cant merit, and a judicial resolution of the dispute could readily be sup-
ported either way. However, as with deferred purchase, the broad
discretion assigned the public agency in administering the competitive
bidding process91 carries with it the necessary implication that the
agency will, at all times, act in pursuit of the defined purposes of the Act.
Any deviation from this obligation may be contested through protest fil-
ings and is thereby subject to judicial review. Moreover, it clearly places
89. Some of the original bidders may not be interested in further pursuing the project for a
variety of reasons: conflicting bid schedules, position relative to the low bidders, error in the original
bid submitted, or unwillingness to expend additional funds.
90. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 54, 65 and 79 and accompanying text.
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the agency in a position of superior bargaining power to avoid a contrac-
tual commitment until all the terms of that commitment have been re-
solved to the best interest of the general public.
V. CONCLUSION
The Oklahoma Public Competitive Bidding Act of 1974 clearly
prescribes the process by which impropriety in the award of public con-
tracts may be challenged. The real question is, what constitutes an im-
proper award? Cases involving improper motives serve as the
prototypical example because the impropriety of a motive is defined in
terms of the purposes of the Act; le., securing for the public the "best
bargain" available through "free and open competition."
Less clear, however, are those cases in which motive is not at issue
but rather the process employed. The result in such cases is necessarily
dependent upon the relative importance assigned to the competing pur-
poses. Absent clear legislative intent as to the proper assignment of this
relative importance, the judiciary is placed in the position of balancing
these purposes.
Should the judiciary determine that maintaining the integrity of the
process is of greater value, it will likely employ a strict statutory interpre-
tation to maximize the "free and open competition" feature of the Act.
However, should it be determined that the purposes are of relatively
equal value or that the "best bargain" purpose is superior, a practical
reading of the statutory language is likely to be considered more appro-
priate. In any event, with the reliance of the construction industry in
Oklahoma shifting to public works projects, it is inevitable that such diffi-
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